Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyse how scientists transform their scientific and technological (S&T) human capital into financial capital through the creation of start-up companies.
Previous research has either studied the linkages between start-ups' performance and the composition of their founder networks (Baum et al., 2000) while Shane and Stuart (Shane et al., 2002) focus on the influence of entrepreneurs' resources on the life expectancy of the firm. Both of these sets of research focus on firm performances. Other research focuses on the mechanisms for transferring technology: technological spill over (Cohen et al., 2002) from the public sector research on industrial R&D and the pathways through which the effects are excised (Mowery et al., 2001) ; impacts of public sector research on firm creation (Autant-Bernard et al., 2002; Colyvas et al., 2002; Swann et al., 1999) . This paper benefits from these results. It focuses on the individual strategies to make money by commercialising science via firm creation. Technology transfer through human capital mobility has been recently investigated. It includes hiring of trained researchers to develop a specific research programme or technology (Almeida et al., 1999) as well as firm creation by scientists (Zucker et al., 1998) . S&T human capital is defined as the sum of scientific and technical and social knowledge, skills and resources embodied in a particular individual (Bozeman et al., 2001) Scientists tend to engage in research because they enjoy the challenge. They are also careful about their reputation and sometimes try to valorise their discoveries. Public policies in favour of commercialisation of science (Bayh-Dole act in 1980 in US, Loi Allègre in France in 1999) as well as the emergence of new opportunities based on knowledge-based industries has led to a new wave of firm creation by scientists. Recent years have seen experiments by star scientists (Stephan, 1999; Zucker et al., 1999) as well as those less well known in firm creation (Mangematin et al., 2003) . Success stories of star scientists who found fast growing star-up like Greg Venter have been emphasised. Meanwhile, other scientists are creating small firms which remain small. Different pathways to valorise S&T human capital through firm creation seem to exist. Do scientists with different levels of S&T human capital set-up different kinds of firms? Do they occupy different positions within the firm (Chief Executive Officer, scientific advisors, etc.)? Do their positions in the public sector research (tenure, non tenure, diploma and experience) influence the pathway by which they valorise their S&T human capital? In Section 3 we examine the cases of 132 founders who created 62 New Biotechnological Firms (NBF) in France. Human capital is estimated by initial training, position in academia and on-the-job training (experience).
Returns on human capital are estimated by the position within the firm. Section 4 discusses the determinants of two individual trajectories according to the renown of the scientists, to their position in academia and to their involvement in firms.
The role of human resource mobility in technology transfer in state-of-the -art technologies
Biotechnology is a new industry that is knowledge-based and predominantly composed of new small firms that have close ties with university-based scientists. These start-ups play a particular role in industrial organization as they provide a link between large firms and academic organisations. Scientific and technological production requires a circulation of knowledge (Winter, 1987) . Leonard-Barton argues that knowledge transfer requires various mechanisms of communication such as the transfer of people when the level of codifiability is low. The more knowledge is tacit, the greater the variety of modes of transfer: articles, patents, and also temporary or permanent personal mobility, joint ventures, etc. (Mangematin et al., 1999) . Because tacit knowledge is embodied in individuals, it is more likely to be diffused within the organization than outside of it. Almeida et al. (Almeida et al., 2002) show that multinational firms transfer knowledge across countries more effectively than alliances because they are able to mobilise key persons. Even within the firm, tacit knowledge is sticky and does not flow easily unless the individuals possessing it also move (Szulanski et al., 2001) . When knowledge is difficult to separate from those who produce and possess it, because it is tacit, hiring people from other organizations is a way of transferring otherwise immobile knowledge. The phenomenon of post doctoral illustrates the importance of human mobility in circulating knowledge. It is a way for young scientists to acquire specific tacit knowledge and know-how developed in a given organization. Hiring skilled people is also a way for an organisation to acquire critical knowledge. The mobility of experienced scientists not only provides a one-time technology transfer of information, as is often the case in technology licensing; it also facilitates the transfer of competencies, permitting further knowledge building (Kim, 1997), especially because experienced people bring their own networks into the firm.
Knowledge transfer between universities and firms occurs when university-based scientists found a firm with the explicit goal of developing knowledge created in their university lab.
From an individual point of view, the decision to become an entrepreneur is generally considered in human capital models as a means to gain a higher income than could be attained as a n employee (Campbell, 1992) 2 . Douglas and Shepherd study (Douglas et al., 2002) emphasizes that the intention to be an entrepreneur is stronger for those with more positive attitudes to risk and independence. The process m eans that university-based scientists play different roles. When university-based scientists physically move from academic laboratories to their start-ups, they usually play a leading role within the start-up, as CEO (Chief Executive Officer) or as a board director (usually research director).
However, partial or temporary mobility does exist. Founders can go back to academia after the founding stage or they can keep a part time position in academia. In that case, they serve as scientific advisers or part-time scientific directors within the start-up.
The role that university-based scientists play varies according their position in academia and their renown. Those who are faculty members, such as tenured scientists, may transfer technology and knowledge for a short period of time by founding a start-up and then return to academia. Those who were hired on soft (contract money for example) money in academia (post docs, contract researchers, etc.) may found a firm to create their own jobs.
They will then stay w ithin the firm after the founding phase. When Audretsch and Stephan (Audretsch et al., 1999) compare academic founders and founders from industry, they focus on the ability of scientists to appropriate the value of knowledge embedded in their human capital along with the incentive structure influencing if and how scientists choose to commercialise their knowledge. They find that academic founders are older and more eminent -in term of citations -than those from industry. Academic founders held part-time positions within the firms -as consultants or members of the scientific advisory boardwhile those scientists whose careers had been entirely spent working in industry held fulltime positions. These remarks lead to two related hypotheses: focused on a business model, in which entrepreneurs rely on growth forecasts to persuade capital investors (business angels and venture capitalists) to invest in a radical innovation project. Firms aim for a world market to commercialise their innovation, and an initial public offering (IPO) enables initial investors to make profits that offset their risky initial investment. But not all firms aim to be listed on the stock exchange. Some firms are not designed to experience exponential growth, and choose to target local markets (Mangematin et al., 2003) . One can expect that a scientist who has a permanent position in academia and a part-time position in a start-up may be involved in a riskier firm than a less famous or nontenured scientist who relies solely on his or her position in a start-up. However famous (star) scientists are supposed to realize breakthrough innovations and to derive economic value from their research. websites allow us to identify most of the founders involved in the firm's creation. These data were completed and checked through short interviews with the founders.
Data and methods

To
Data on founders covers five different areas: personal characteristics (gender and age) initial training i.e. highest diploma or grade, professional experience (scientific or managerial, in academia or in industry), status at the set-up of the firm (student, faculty member, employee) and position within the firm 5 years after the creation (Executive or advisory position).
The founders' initial training represents the start-up's basic human capital. Additional competencies and know-how are captured by analysing careers and professional trajectories.
Inspired by Audretsch and Stephan's work on professional trajectories of scientists (Audretsch et al., 1999) iii) Managerial experience (EXPMNGT) corresponds to a position of top manager in any private firm (marketing, business development, financial, commercial, operating or general director exclude of scientific director.
iv)
Experience of serial founder (SERIALFD) describes founders who create several biotech start-ups. 6 Finally, as the aim of the paper is to analyse how founders valorise their human capital and skills within firms, the positions they occupy after the founding are described (VALOPOST variable). We chose to record their positions five years after the firm creation. For those firms that did not last five years (6 firms The second set of data describes the start-ups. Only new science-based firms are analysed in this sample (Autio, 1995) . 13 Biotech SMEs are recent: most of the firms are less than ten years old on average and most are involved in the newest technologies (genomics and post genomics) (Lemarie et al., 2000) . Biotech SMEs are active in a large variety of markets, i.e.
human, animal and plant health, cosmetics, agriculture, agro-food and diagnostics. The firms are small in terms of employee numbers and turnover. Most of them are not profitable in the period studied. They are at the beginning of their life cycle and need large investments before generating enough turnover to cover running costs. They are science-based. On average, R&D expenditures account for over 66% of the turnover. These SMEs obviously belong to a high-tech sector. Some 76% of the founders have a scientific background and 13 Firms in the sample can be described as follows: (1) the business idea of the firms is essentially based on exploiting advanced technological knowledge developed or acquired in a source of technology; (2) each firm has been independent at least during its early years of existence; (3) each firm is entrepreneurial, that is, it is controlled and managed by an entrepreneur or by a group of entrepreneurs at least at the beginning; (4) their founders were affiliated with the source of technology before establishing the comp any. In earlier works (Mangematin et al., 2003) we clearly identified two sub-groups with different levels of risk. Table 2 presents the main characteristics of the two sub-samples of firms. Traditional firms generate sufficient cash flow (in average, positive net income = 58 K €) to finance their current business, including research. In fact only one out of three such firms turns to venture capitalists (VC) to finance its development. By contrast, over two-thirds of risky firms rely on capital financing since the turnover generated by the firm is not enough to cover R&D 14 In the total population of 200 French biotech firms, 44 are subsidiary companies.
costs. The difference between the date of creation of risky and traditional firms is not significant. Empirically, the business model is described through the firm's initial project and the financing of the running activities during the first years of the firm. Does the firm need to run huge research programs before entering the market? (Criterion: size of the innovation project). If the firm develops a huge research program funded by external financing, it is said to be risky. If not, its level of risk is similar to other start-ups and not really specific to the biotech sector (Mangematin et al., 2003) . The expected net value of a share of risky firm is supposed to be higher than traditional ones, it is the reason venture capitalists invest. The following section presents the econometric models and main results.
Models and Empirical results
Do university-based scientists valorise their human capital in a specific way compared with other founders? Does a high degree of human capital lead to specific ways of valorising it?
Valorising scientific and human capital for a scientist means generating revenues (wages and capital) from his or her scientific results in addition to their salaries. Here, we only consider one mode of valorisation (firm creation) amongst other (patenting, consulting, etc.).
To In order to exploit the data, and due to the size of the sample, we recode "training" variables and the variables describing the positions occupied by the founders, into several binomial variables. For each endogenous variable, binomial logit models were performed.
The models presented meet the following two conditions: overall relevance (we consider the Akaike criterion here as well as the likelihood ratio and score tests); and good predictive qualities (i.e. they must lead to a majority of well classified observations, a minority of badly qualified observations and a minority of ambiguous cases). Variables such as founder's status and age are not taken into account due to relations with other regressors 15 . If p<1% then ***; if 1%<p<5% then **; if 5%<p<10% then *; if 10%<p <5% Table 3 calls for several comments. Professional experience constitutes the key variable for explaining the position occupied in the start-up. The variables that influence the position of the CEO are primarily experience in i ndustry in a scientific position and number of publications, which play a negative role (models 3 and 4). Among the founders of a start-up, the person who will become CEO will be the one who transforms scientific advances into innovations and cash flows, t hat is, who has already tried out these skills in industry beforehand. Since researchers in industry publish less, the negative coefficient affecting publications is easily explained. To the position of CEO, the founders appoint the person with the required competencies to succeed in the business world. Economic valorisation of the human capital of university-based scientists is accomplished through partnerships with scientists familiar with the industrial world.
Hardly surprisingly, scientific visibility ( number of publications) is the main determinant of participation on the scientific advisory board (model 6). Managerial experience acts negatively, signifying that founders who have managerial experience before set-up participate proportionally less on scientific boards. This observation confirms the results of Zucker et al. (Zucker et al., 1998) and of Stephan et al. (Stephan et al., 1998) . Founders' participation on the scientific board often means that they are not or no longer employed by the firm but that they remain linked to its future. Out of the 132 founders whose function is clearly identified, only 33 are members of these boards, i.e. barely a quarter.
People who were involved in the creation of several firms are proportionally more numerous on boards of directors, while professional experience in academia or in management does not seem to be a determining factor (models 1 and 2). Presence on a board of trustees is also positively correlated with age. It often requires personal financial investment by the shareholder that only individuals who have accumulated enough financial capital can afford.
This presence thus indicates an investment of direct financial capital and not the financial valorisation of human capital considered to be a contribution in kind. Note the excellent prescriptive quality in model 2.
Neither the individuals' personal characteristics nor their initial training seem to play a decisive part in the position they occupy in the start-up. Only MBA graduates, who have often occupied or still occupy positions related to financing in business banks, to consultancy firms or to venture capitalists are proportionally more numerous on boards of directors.
Finally, the absence of the "top management" model is also significant. None of the exogenous variables selected -neither managerial experience nor managerial competencies -has a significant influence on the fact, for a founder, of being in the management of a startup.
On the whole, the two hypotheses are confirmed. Positions on scientific committees are occupied primarily by researchers with considerable scientific renown, related to the number of their publications. Consistent with the results of Stephan and Audretsch, (Stephan et al., 1998) , these scientists are involved in firm creation part time and they keep their position in academia. In that case, academics serve as scientific advisers or consultants so as to facilitate and to renew knowledge circulation by providing links with other researchers.
Together with the other founders, they provide the possibility of outsourcing research to university laboratories. They also provide the possibility of using academic equipment in the very early stages of the firm's life. Since the firm cannot afford to invest in costly and dedicated research equipment, the involvement of academics allows it to borrow or rent such facilities from the founders' lab. Technology transfer occurs at the very beginning when researchers found the firm. It is thus on a one-time transfer of a specific technology that the firm is built. This transfer also generates the conditions of a learning process through longterm cooperation between the founder's previous academic lab and the start-up. This includes the evaluation of research programs by being able to mobilize well-known scientists on the scientific advisory board; a signal to the scientific and financial community of the firm's quality via the involvement of highly visible scientists; and making the firm attractive to young and brilliant researchers who would like to join a company managed by well-known scientists. If p<1% then ***; if 1%<p<5% then **; if 5%<p<10% then *; if 10%<p <5%
Only the experience variables are significant. They all vary in the same direction. The more experienced the founder, the more they create risky firms. Firms based on a radical 
Conclusion and discussion
Our empirical analysis highlights two contrasting modes of valorisation of human capital: on the one hand, scientists who have the highest S&T human capital in terms of reputation and scientific visibility (estimated through publications) play a similar part to investors in financial capital. They bring their S&T human capital to the firm and have a strategic and scientific advisory role. They offer the firm access to an extensive scientific network and multiple contacts with industrial partners, as shown by the seminal study by Liebeskind,
Oliver et al. (Liebeskind et al., 1996) . Their reputation enhances the firm's credibility vis-à-vis venture capitalists (Maurer, 2001) . Famous academics involved in start-ups have effective S&T human capital of several kinds: scientific competence, renown in the scientific community and beyond, and a large network of relations. Their savoir-faire enables them to bridge the academic and economic worlds, from which the start-up benefits.
Their interest in scientific challenges and their scientific level prompts them to embark on the creation of new businesses that can have a major impact on the industry. They thus transform their S&T human capital into financial capital (shareholding of high growth potential firms).
By contrast, less famous scientists cannot valorise a stock of S&T human capital but they do have S&T competencies and expertise. They use this potential to generate wages. Thus, they are involved in the firm in a managerial position. The creation of the start-up is based on the transformation of scientific results into innovations, which generate turnover to pay salaries.
However, the start-up does not get an exponential potential growth. It has to generate cash flows to finance its development and even its survival.
These results reveal the paradox of the transformation of S&T human capital into financial capital: Star scientists transform their S&T human capital into financial capital through part time involvement in promising start-ups while less famous scientists involved in the management ensure their salaries through their activity within the firm.
The participation of star scientists is supposed to be so valuable that, even if it is partial, investors (shareholders in particular) use it as a quality signal. Such behaviour covers a paradox regarding the agency theory.
The basic argument of contract theory i s that the behaviour of the different parties involved -in this case the scientific founders, the financiers and the managers -can be explained and coordinated in the framework of the principal/agent theory. Agency costs include the cost incurred by the shareholder to detect opportunistic behaviour and the costs of incentives for agents to pursue shareholder interests. As P. McNamara (McNamara, 2003) notes, agency costs are very high for shareholders in biotechnology firms because they must not only monitor the firm's managers but also evaluate the relevance of scientific and technical results. The founders' credibility and scientific reputation play an important part in the creation of trust in a context where knowledge asymmetries seem i rreducible. Capital investors thus base their decisions on the presence, among the founders, of star scientists to "guarantee" the relevance of their scientific results. The guarantee is nevertheless partial, for the personal commitment of high-level scientists is limited in both financial terms and in employment terms as they retain their positions at university. Moreover, if the risk of a loss of reputation were to constitute a credible threat warranting the monitoring of their behaviour, it would require strong links between the financial and scientific worlds, which do not exist. The only ties that financiers and especially venture capitalists have with the scientific world are as observers: they are not real actors because they have no scientific legitimacy. Hence, the involvement of the most renowned scientists appears to be "cheap talk" (Meidinger et al., 1999) , that is, a commitment based only on the goodwill of the person who makes it. This is the first paradox facing the most risky biotech firms. Those who have the highest levels of S&T human capital seem to be able to valorise their human scientific capital economically by minimizing their personal risks, unlike those that have financial capital, even if the transfer of the scientist's patent rights to the firm limits this effect.
Stephan and Levin (Stephan et al., 1996) show that because of the winner-takes-all nature of the scientific race, it is not surprising that financial compensation of university-based scientists is structured in two parts: a guaranteed portion paid regardless of success in research, and a priority-based portion reflecting the value of their contribution to science.
One of the paradoxes of the second part of the compensation for star scientists is that it corresponds to a valorisation of that which already exists and not to an incentive to achieve scientifically and to create human capital. Our observations strengthen the argument of
Stephan and Levin by showing that the winner-takes-all phenomenon applies not only to the scientific domain and that, for a small number of star scientists, it applies also to the financial context. When star scientists set up a firm, they seem to be doing nothing other than valorising a stock of existing human capital. The creation of firms seems to be an activity of specific valorisation enabling them to build permanent bridges between their university and the firm, and thus to "refill the tube" of scientific results. By contrast, less well-known researchers must s imultaneously build up human and financial capital and valorise it. Their activity is more sequential.
This research is still ongoing. Three developments can be done. A larger sample of firms will strengthen our results about the paradox of transforming S &T human capital into financial capital. It is also necessary to integrate firm trajectories and performances into the analysis. In the five years covered in our analysis period, all 62 firms survived. However, in
2002 we observed two bankruptcies and ten acquisitions. Finally, it would be helpful to have information about the value of the firms to compare the effective richness of the different categories of founders and the effectiveness of the transformation of S&T human capital into financial capital.
